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HrLYAR

A. No. 23223.

v.

UNION leE

Co.

C.2d

In Bank.

RA Y:M:OND E. HIL Y AR, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v. UNION
ICE COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents.
Dismissal-Nonsuit--When Motion Granted.--A nonsuit may
be granted only when,
conflicting evidence and
giving plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is
entitled, indulging in every legitimate inference which may
be drawn tlwrcfrom, the resua is a determination that there
is no evidence of sufficient substantblity to support a verdict
for plaintiff.
[2] Automobilea-Nonsuit.-In an action for injuries to a 51fzyear-old boy who was struck by nn ice truck operating on the
private streets of a trailer camp, it was error to grant a nonsuit as to defendant truck d:river where it could have been
inferred, from pictures of the truck in evidence, that a small
child could have been directly in front of the cab or at either
side without being seen by the dri vcr unless he were keeping
a close watch for children nnd that, when looking through the
rear-view mirrors, he might have missed seeing a small child
directly in front of him; where it could have been inferred,
from the child's statement that the truck hit him and ran over
his back, that he was either in front of the truck as it made
a turn or slightly to its ldt; and where it could have been
inferred, from the driver's testimony that he did not see the
child, that he failed to see the child because he wns not exercising the care commensurate with the danger to be avoided
in that he knew small children played in the area and knew,
or should have known, that children aTe unpredictable.
[3] Negligence-Ordinary Care.-All persons are required to use
ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the
result of their conduct, and ordinary care is that degree of
care which people of ordinarily prudent behavior can be reasonably expected to exercise under the circumstances of a given
case.
[4) Id.-Care Proportioned to Danger.-The ordinary care required
of per8ons to prevent others being injured as the result of
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 48;
Am.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and N onmit, § 42.
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., N Pgligence, § 24; Am.Jur., Neg-ligence, § 31.
!.l[cK. Dig. References: [1]
[2, 13, 16] Automobiles,§ 273a;
§ 23; [5, 6]
Automobiles, § 122; (7]
Automobiles,
§276: [91 AutomobilPs, ~2()2(1); (10]
~Hl; [11.12]
Eviden(;c 1 8655(1); lUJ
.\gcucy, ~ 13.
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their acts must be in proportion to the danger to be avoided
and the consequences that might reasonably be anticipated.
Automobiles-Care Toward Ohildren.-The presence of children is in itself a warning to driver of motor vehicle requiring
the exercise of care for their safety.
Id.-Oare Toward Ohildren.-If the evidence shows that a
motor vehicle driver had knowledge of the presence of chilhe may be held responsible for injury to a child although it appears that he did not see child in time to prevent
the injury.
!d.-Province of Court and Jury-Care Toward Children.-In
an aetion for injuries to a 5%-year-old boy who was struek by
an ice truck operating on the private streets of a trailer camp,
where the truck driver knew that children were playing in the
area and testified that he had warned children away from
the truck and that he had not sounded his horn from the time
he started it up until plaintiff was hit, and where the accident
occurred not far from the child's home, it was daylight and
the view was unobstructed, the trier of fact might have concluded that the driver's conduct was not the degree of care
required of one using a dangerous instrumentality in the
immediate vicinity of small children, and such issue should
have been submitted to the jury.
[8] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Signals.-In an action for
injuries to a 5lj2 -year-old boy who was struck by an ice truck
operating on the private streets of a trailer camp, whether
under the circumstances presented it was "reasonably necessary" to sound the horn to "insure safe operation" of the truck
(Veh. Code, § 671, sub d. (b)) should have been a question of
fact for the jury.
[9] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Proximate Cause.-In an
action for injuries to a 5%-year-old boy who was struck by an
ice truck operating on the private streets of a trailer camp,
whether or not under the circumstances presented defendant
driver~s failure to sound the horn or his failure to look more
closely for children in his way constituted the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries should have been submitted to the jury.
[10] Negligence-Evidence.-An absence of eyewitnesses and evidence as to the manner in which the accident occurred is not
fatal to plaintiff's case.
[11] Evidence-Sufficiency-Circumstantial Evidence.-To establish a theory by circumstantial evidence it is not necessary
that the facts be such and so related to each other that such
theory is the only conclusion that can fairly or reasonably be
drawn.
[12] Id.-Sufficlcncy-ClircumstantinJ Evidence.-A plaintiff relyinjii on c.ir<:um::;tautial evide1wc docs not have to exclude the
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possibility of every other reasonable inference possibly de$
rivahle from the facts proved.
[13] Automobiles-Nonsuit.-In an action for injuries to a 51lz·
year-old boy who was struck by an ice truck operating on the
private streets of a trailer camp, where there was in evidence
the child's statement to the officers and his mother that the
truck ran over him, the driver's statement "I hit him," and
the driver's statement of his knowledge of children playing
in the area, that he did not sound his horn, and that he did
not look to the right or left as he made a left-hand turn, it
was reasonably inferable that, had he looked, he would have
seen plaintiff, or, had he sounded his horn, he would have
warned the child away from the moving truck, and it was
error to grant a nonsuit as to such driver.
[14] !d.-Evidence-Injuries to Children in Streets.-In an action
for injuries to a 5ljz-year-old boy who was struck by an ice
truck operating on the private streets of a trailer camp, where
there was evidence relatmg to the condition and position of
the child's body about 20 feet from the corner of a street at
which the driver made a left turn, and where the evidence
showed that the child was on his way back from the park bathroom and that there was only a dirt road on which to walk,
the inference was that he was walking in the street at the
time he was struck by defendant's truck.
[15] Agency-Existence-Evidence-Declarations of Agent.-An
agency cannot be established by declarations of the agent not
under oath or in the principal's presence.
[16] Automobiles-Nonsuit.-In an action for injuries to a 5%year-old boy who was struck by an ice truck operating on the
private streets of a trailer camp, a nonsuit as to defendant
ice company was properly granted where the uncontradicted
facts shvwed a wholesaler-retailer relationship between such
defendant and defendant truck driver, and where there was
no evid~?nce of sufliciPnt substantinlity on the issue of agency
to have permitted the cause to go to the jury.

APPEAI; from judgmrnts of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Wilbur C. Curtis, Judge. One judgment
affirmed; other judgment reversed.
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment of
nonsuit in favor of defendant Union Ice Company, affirmed;
judgment of nonsuit in favor of defendant Charles Irwin
Ingram, reversed.
{15] See Cal.Jur.2d, Agency, § 15; Am.Jur., Agency, § 445.

v. UNION IcE Co.

33

C.2d 30; 286 P.2d 211

Elconin
Benjamin Elconin, Hirson & Horn and
Theodore A. Horn for Appellant.
P. Kinkle and George P. Kinkle, Jr., for Respondent
Union Ice Co.
& Ruppe and E. Spurgeon Rothrock for

J.-This is an appeal by plaintiff from judgnonsuit entered in favor of defendants Charles Irwin
(sued as Charles Irwin lngerman) and Union Ice
for damages for personal injuries.
a 51fz-year-old boy, was run over, or hit, and
seriously and permanently injured by an ice truck driven by
defendant Ingram. The only question involved is whether
there was sufiicient evidence of negligence on the part of
Ingram to permit the case to go to the jury. A subsidiary
is whether there was sufficient evidence of an agency
relationship between defendant Ingram and defendant Ice
Company to submit that issue to the jury.
There were no eyewitnesses to the accident which occurred
in the early afternoon, around 2 o'clock and the evidence is
almost without conflict. The record shows that plaintiff, and
his family, lived in a trailer camp or park which was privately
owned. The trailer camp contains two north-south roads
(" C" and "B ") about 20 or 22 feet wide which are unpaved
and full of chuckholes and bumps and ruts. These roads
have neither curbs, nor sidewalks and are used by both
pedestrian and vehicle trafiic. On either side of each street
are the trailer houses. There is a road running east and west
at the southern end of the camp. The Hilyar trailer was
located on the east side of "0" street, the small north-south
road on the west side of the camp. The only bath and toilet
house in the camp is located in the southwest corner of "0"
street at its most northerly end. Plaintiff's mother was
visiting in a trailer located on the westerly side of "B" street
and had permitted plaintiff to go to the bathhouse alone as
he had often done before if, as she testified, he would come
right back. Defendant Ingram, driving a truck bearing the
name "UNION IcE" in large block letters on both its doors,
was delivering ice to the trailer on the southwest corner of

ec.2d-a
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"C" street; this trailer was directly opposite that in which
the Hilyars lived. Driver
testified that after he had
delivered the ice, be walked around from the right side of his
truck to the back; that there were children playing around it
and that he warned them i.o get away from the truck; that he
then got back "up" on the truck and started the motor;
that he ''glanced in my mirrors and headed south for a few
feet and made my left-hand turn east." This testimony shows
that he was driving south, that he turned to the left into the
east-west street and proceeded in an easterly direction. He
testified that he looked through the mirrors when he started
up; that he looked out of the truck to see if there were any
children to the right or left of the truck; that he was driving
in second g·ear at from 3 to 4 miles an hour; that he did not
sound his horn. He testified that he drove along the eastwest street until he carne to '' B'' street, a distance of about
65 feet, and that he again made a left-hand tnrn in order
to proceed in a northerly direction on "B" street. The
record shows that as he made the turn onto "B" street, he
did not sound his horn, nor did he look to see if there were any
children on the right, or around the truck and he didn't see
any children ; that as he was about 20 feet from the corner
(where he made the turn) the :first he knew that anything
unusual had happened was when he heard "some kind of noise
in the back" and a little boy (not the injured child) "hollered'' at him that something had happened ''back there'';
that he jumped out of the 12ft, or driver's, seat of the truck
and started down toward where the injured child was lying
calling for help. The injured child was lying on the road in
a prone position about 20 feet from the corner and approximately 2 feet from a picket fence on the easterly side of the
street. The record shOYIS that right after the acciclent defendant Ingram kept yelling "l\1y God! My God! I hit him."
Mrs. Hilyar testified that plaintiff, immediately after the
accident, said ''I was 1valking and the truck hit me''; that
the accident occurred "not more than ten minutes" after the
child had left for the bathroom. The child failed to qualify
as a witness and by stipulation a statement made by him to
police ofil.cers not long after the accident was admitted in
evidence. The admitted portion of the statement consisted
of the following: "Stated he was walking alongside an ice
truck and the truck turned a corner knocking him to the
groun{l and nm over h back Stnted he ,.,as also knocked into
the fence at his right ;;;ide. V iet.im.••• "
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The record shows that defendant Ingram had delivered ice
to the trailer court for approximatley three years; that he
knew children played in the area. It is also shown that the
truck was a high-bed model with solid sides and a closed cab
some distance from the ground. There were running boards
underneath both doors. The overall length was approximately
15 feet.
Bearing in mind that this is an appeal from judgments of nonsuit and the rule that " . . . a nonsuit may be
granted only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, giving
to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally
entitled and indulging in every legitimate inference which
may be drawn from that evidence favorable to plaintiff's case,
the result is a determination that there is no evidence of
sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of plaintiff" (Dunn v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 43 Cal.2d 265, 268
[272 P.2d 745] ; Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal.2d 92, 95 (272
P.2d 26]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d
310 [282 P.2d 12]) we must look at plaintiff's evidence
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in order to determine whether it can be said as a matter of law that there
is no evidence of negligence on the part of defendant Ingram.
[2] Ingram was aware that children played in the area
of the streets of the trailer camp; he was aware that there
were children around his truck when he started to drive from
'' C'' to '' B'' street; he admitted be had not sounded his horn;
that he did not look for children on the right of the truck, nor
around it. From the pictures of the truck in evidence, it
could have been logically inferred that because of its height
and the distance of the cab windows from the road, that a.
small child could have been directly in front of the cab,
or at either side, without being seen by the driver unless
he were keeping a close watch for children. The only direct
evidence of care exercised by the driver is his testimony that
he looked in his rear-view mirrors for children when he first
started up. There is no evidence that after starting he
looked out the side windows, or the front windshield. From
this the trier of fact could have determined that when looking
through the mirrors, he might have missed seeing a small
child directly in front of him. There is evidence that at no
time did defendant Ingram sound his horn to warn children
away from the moving vehicle. From the child's statement
that the truck hit him and ran over his back, it could have
been reasonably inferred that he was either in front of the
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truck as it made the turn, or slightly to its left. From
defendant Ingram's testimony that he did not see tbe child,
it could have been inferred that he did not see tlw (·hild
because he was not exercising the care commensurate with the
danger to be avoided in that he knew small children played
in the area and knew, or should have known, that chih1ren
are unpredictable
v. Central-Gaither U. Sch. Dist.,
13:3 Cal..App. 124 [23 P.2d 769] ).
'l'he police officer, 'rhomas, testified that in
's signrd
statement to him concerning the accident, he had stated
that he was driving between 4 and 5 miles an hour. The
jury may Yery well have believed this statement concerning
the speed of the vehicle and have concluded that such speed
was not the exercise of due care under all the circumstances.
[3] All persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as the result of their conduct;
ordinary care is that degree of care which people of ordinarily
prudent behavior can be reasonably expected to exercise under
the circumstances of a given case. [4] In other words, the
care required must be in proportion to the danger to be
avoided and the consequences that might reasonably be anticipated (Crowe v. McBride, 25 Ca1.2d 318, 321 [153 P.2d 727];
Hatzalcorzian v. Rucker-Fnller Desk Co., 197 Cal. 82, 98
[239 P. 709, 41 A.L.R. 1027]; Warner v. Santa Catalina
Island Co., sttpra, 44 Cal.2d 310; Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d
325 [287 P.2d 7]).
[5] In Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal.App.2d 217, 224 [148 P.2d
680], it was held that "The presence of children is in itself
a warning requiring the exercise of care for their safety.
(Seperman v. Lyon Fire Proof Stomge Co., 97 Cal.App. 654
[275 P. 980] .) [6] Moreover, if the evidence shows that a
driver has knowledge of the presence of children he may be
held to have been responsible although it appears that he did
not see the injured child in time to prevent the injury.
(See 2 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp., p. 454.) This is especially
true where the injury occurs in or about the child's home.
(Cambou v. Marty, 98 Cal.App. 598 [277 P. 365] .) "
[7] There can be no question but that here the driver of the
ice truck knew that children were playing in the area. He,
himself, testified that he had warned the children away from
the truck; he also testified that he had not sounded his horn
from the time he started it up until the plaintiff was hit.
The accident occurred not far from the rhild 's home. It was
daylight, the view was unobstructed, and the trier of fact.
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1lwt the driver's con(luct under
cireumstances, was not the degree of care required of one
a
instrumentality in the immediate Yieinity
swall cllildn'n !Jensen v. Jllinard, supra, 44 Cal.2,1 323).
, subdiyision (b), of the Vehicle Code prodriver of a motor vehicle when reasonably
to iwmre safe operation shall give audible warnhis horn. 'Vhether under the circumstances here
it
"reasonably necessary" to sound the horn
operation'' should have been a question of
In Ducat v. Goldner, 77 Cal.App.2d 332,
I 175 P.2d
, it was held that "appellant had no right
to a;::;ume that the road wa~ clear but it was his duty to be
and to anticipate the presence of others in the
'l'he fact that he did not know that respondent was
in the street is no excuee for his failure to give warning
v. Lagomarsino, 196 Cal. 308, 317 [237 P. 1066];
v. Bradford. 54 Cal.App. 157, 159 [201 P. 471) ) . . . . "
It was there held tbat the darkness of the streets and the
condition of the weather required that a reasonably prudent
person should sound his horn to insure the safe operation
of his vehicle when turning a corner at a place where a
pedestrian might reasonably be expected to be found. In
Ji'recland v. J cwcl Tea Co., 118 Cal.App.2d 764, 769 [258 P.2d
1032], it was held that it is ordinarily necessary to exercise
care for the protection and safety of young children
than for adult persons possessing normal and mature faculties (Conroy v. Perez, supra, 64 Cal.App.2d 217, 224); that
their conduct is unpredictable and one operating a motor
vehicle should anticipate their thoughtlessness and impulsivenc~s (Shannon v. Ccnt1·al-Gaither U. Sch. Dist., supra, 133
Cal.App. 124). It was also held that the presence of children
itself a warning requiring the exercise of care for their
'l'he conrt concluded that where children were known
to be playing in the strret, the negligence, if any, of the
driYer of a motor vehicle was a question of fact for the jury.
In De La Torre v. Valenzuela, 102 Cal.App.2d 586 [228 P.2d
, it was held to be a question of fact for the jury whether
or not under all the circumstances defendant's failure to
sound a horn proximately contributed to plaintiff's injury.
It has been held in numerous cases that the issue of proximate cause is essentially one of fact (De La Torre v. Valensupra, 102 Cal.App.2d 586, 591; Fennessey v. Paci~
G(l.$ Q; Elec. Co.1 20 Cal.2d 141 [124 P.2d 51] ; Mosle31 v. Arden
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Farms Co., 26 Cal.2d 213, 219 [157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R 872];
Crowe v. McBrlde, supra, 25 Cal.2d 318, 321; Warner v. Santa
Catalina Island Co., supra, 44 Cal.2d 310; Dunn v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 43 Cal.2d 265, 278). [9] TTnrler the
circumstances here presented, whether or not dGfu,dant driver's failure to sound the horn, or his failure to look more
closely for children in his way, constituted the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries should have been submitted to the jury.
As the court said in Fredericksen v. Costner, 99 CaLApp.2d
453, 458 [221 P.2d 1008], whether defendant was negligent in
starting his truck without making any further effort to ascertain the conduct and whereabouts of the plaintiff's decedent
was a question of fact. "It cannot be said, as a matter of
law, that he exercised the degree of care which a reasonable
person would have exercised nnder similar circumstances to
protect Cheryl [decedent] from harm. The case presents
a question of fact which should have been left to the jury."
Defendant Ingram contends that a verdict and judgment
cannot rest upon conjecture and speculation. He argues
that there is no evidence concerning the point of impact.
[10] In Dunn v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 43 Cal.2d
265, 278-279, it was held that an absence of eyewitnesses and
evidence as to the manner in which the accident occurred
was not fatal to plaintiff's case. [11] In Sande;·s v. MacFarlane's Candies, 119 CaLApp.2d 497, 500 [259 P.2d 1010],
where a judgment of nonsuit was reversed, and where there
were no eyewitnesses, it was said: " 'It is not necessary, in
order to establish a theory by circumstantial evidence, that
the facts be such and so related to each other that such
theory is the only conclusion that can fairly or reasonably
be drawn therefrom . . . . ' " (Katenkarnp v. Union Realty
Co., 36 Cal.App.2d 602, 617 [98 P.2d 239].) (12] "The
plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence does not have to
exclude the possibility of every other reasonable inference
possibly deri vnble from the facts proved. ( Vaccarezza v.
Sanguinetti, 71 Cal.App.2d 687, 692 [163 P.2d 470]; Spolter
v. Fonr-Whcel Brahe Serv. Co., s~tpra, [99 Cal.App.2d 6~!0
(222 P.2d 307)], at p. 694.)" (Sanders v. JlacFarlane's
Candies, supra, 119 Ca1.App.2d 497, 500; see also Summers
v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91] .)
Defendant Ingram relies upon Greene v. A.tchison, T. &
S. F. Ry. Co., 120 Cal.App.2d 135, J42 [260 P.2d 834, 40
A.I.1.R.2d 873]. in ~npport of his theory that a judgment for
plaintiff here would be the result of conjecture and specula-
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the Greene caGe,
's decedent was found
near the railroad tracks. 'l'here were no witnesses;
there 1vas only the inference, from the position and condition
of the
that a train, or some portion thereof, must have
the decedent. The court there held that if there was
including reasonable infereucrs therefrom,
would support a finding of defendant's negligence, the
of nonsuit must be reversed. The Greene case
distin~uished from the one under consideration.
Here we have ihr child's statement to the officers and
mother that the truck ran over him; we have the driver's
statement "I hit him!"; we have the driver's statement of
his
of children playing in the area and that he
did uot sound his horn, and that he did not look to the right
or left as he made his left-ham! turn into "B" street. From
evidence it is reasonably inferable that had he looked,
would have seen the plaintiff, or that had he sounded his
horn. he would have warned the child away from the moving
trnek.
[14] Defendant driver also argues that there is no evidence
relating to the point of impact. There is no merit to this
argument because from the evidence relating to the condition
and position of the child's body, and from his statements to
his mother and the police, and from Mrs. Hilyar 's testimony
that the child was lying about 2 feet from the picket fence,
it could be reasonably concluded that the child was hit close
to the corner of '' B'' street at its intersection with the east\Yest street about 20 feet therefrom.
Becam'e the evidence
shows tlwt the child vvas on his way back from the park
bathroom and that there was only the dirt road on which to
walk. the inference is that he was walking in the street at
the time he \Vas struck by defendant's truck
Plaintiff contN1ds, and defendant Union Ice Company
denies. that an agency relationship existed between Ingram
and the company. The record shows tlJat on both doors of
the cab of tl1e truel' appeared a shield with the vvords "U::-.aoN
ICE" in large block letters. Printed in much smaller letters
just over the sign, appeared the name "Chas, Ingram" and
in letters of approximately the same size. underneath the
words "UNION IcE" appeared the word "Distrilmtor. '' The
shield on which these words were painted was red, white
and blue, apparently the colors of the Union Ice Company,
From the photographs, it appe<Jrs that the words "Chas,
Ingram" and "Distributor" had been painted in a rather
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amateurish fashion, while the words "UNION ICE" appeared
to have been done professionally. The evidence appears to
be without conflict that the truck was owned by Ingram;
that Union Ice Company furnished no parts, tires, repairs,
or any parking space therefor.
A contract, or agreement, existed between defendant Ingram and defendant Union Ice Company. It was provided
therein that Ingram was designated as the "Distributor"
and the company as the "Manufacturer." It appeared that
Union Ice had entered into similar contracts with other distributors by which they were given certain territories in
which to sell ice. The agreement provided that the manufacturer would "sell" ice to the distributor who would "buy"
it at certain presl:ribed prices and sell it at retail at ''such
reasonable prices as shall yield a reasonable profit unto the
Distributor, al](] in no event at a minimum price lower than
that for which the Manufacturer itself sells ice at retail to
the same classes of trade as served by the Distributor, as set
forth . . . " on current schedules. The agreement provided it
was to continue for a five-year period; that it was not assignable without the manufacturer's consent; and that if the
distributor desired to sell his ''ice merchandising and distributing business,'' the manufacturer was to be given ten
days' notice and an option to purchase at the terms offered
by any prospective purchaser. The agreement provided that
the distributor was to give his "faithful, active and conscientious personal attention to the sale and distribution"
of ice in his own territory. It was provided, also, that he
was not to sell out of his territory. Any failure to comply
with the terms of the contract was to be considered a breach
thereof for whicll the contract might be terminated. The
contract provided that each distributor was an independent
contractor and that it was not intended to create the '' relationship of employee and employer, principal and agent, or
that of master and servant.''
Defendant Ingram testified that he had distributed ice
manufactured by Union Ice Company since 1951; that he
had handled no other ice; that he took ice out on one day
and paid for it the next morning; that he had no regular
hours; that at a time when he had employed others, he had not
checked with the company. Police Officer Thomas testified
that Ingram had signed a statement a few hours after the
accident in which he had said that he was employed by the
Union Ice Company giving its address and phone number.
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VIce
manager of the
(by deposition) that distributors were
to use the sign "Union Ice Products" on their
and that after the accident defendant
made
to some official of the company.
relies principally on the case of Smith v. Deutsch,
419 [200 P.2d 802], in support of his theory
of agency was sufficient to submit the issue
Defendant ice company relies upon the case
Meadow Creameries v. Industria}, Ace. Com.,
123 [76 P.2d 724], as negating the agency
These cases will be discussed.
In the Smith case, supra, plaintiff was struck by a taxicab
in the distinctive colors adopted by the cab company
operated by the association. The words ''War VetTaxicab" were painted on the sides of each cab. It
was held that this evidence was sufiicient evidence of ownerAn oD'icer of the War Veterans 'raxicab Association
that the association never had a franchise in Los
; that it owned no cabs; that it had no stands from
which cabs were dispatched; that it did not direct cabs to any
location; that it did not receive a percentage of what the
drivers received in revenue; that members operated their
own cabs; that the driver of the cab in question was not a
member of the association. Other evidence showed that the
driver drove the cab with the knowledge and consent of
defendant association. After the accident, an association
~"".""on,.. 's car drove to the scene, showed his card to police
officers and made measurements, etc.; he remained until a
tow ear removed the taxicab. It was noted by the court that
by-Jaws of the association showed that the association
exercised powers of control over the drivers and that one
of the grounds for expulsion of members was the "inability
perform the duties for which the member of this association was expressly employed to do." The court relied on
the case of Callas v. Independent Taxi Owners' Assn., Inc.,
66 F.2d 192 [62 App.D.C. 212], in which the "situation
almost identical with that in the instant case that
the liability of the defendant was a question of fact to be determined by the jury; that it was not a question of law; that
plaintiff's case rested on the presumption of ownership arising
from the fact that the cab bore its name and colors; that
the presumption was evidence and was sufficient to take the
case to the jury." The court concluded that the evidence
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was so complete as to leave no doubt that Deu1s~h was operating under the direction and control of defendant association.
In the case at bar there is no question concerning the ownership of the truck-the evidence is without conflict that it was
owned by defendant Ingram.
In the Mountain Meadow case, supra, there was a contract between the Mountain Meadow Creameries, called the
Producer, and one Dodge, called the Distributor. The producer granted to the distributor the right to sell dairy products in a certain territory; the distributor paid cash on delivery of the products to him; the distributor was required
to purchase and maintain a delivery truck and to wear uniforms. The contract provided that it was not intended to
create the relationship of principal and agent between the
producer and the distributor. 'l'he contract provided that
it might be terminated by giving written notice. The court
said: "When we take the contract by its four corners and
construe it as a whole, the conclusion is inescapable that the
Mountain Meadow Creameries placed a milk route in possession of Dodge; that Dodge was required to purchase his
supplies from the corporation and deliver them to the consumers within the district allotted to him. The corporation
occupied the position of a wholesaler who furnished Dodge,
a retailer, with an initial list of customers and sold him merchandise at wholesale prices. Dodge, the retailer, delivered
these supplies to the customers and collected the retail prices
from them." (P. 127.) The termination clause in the contract was construed by the court as not equivalent to the right
of discharge possessed by an employer.
[15] It appears to us that the Mountain Meadow case is
more nearly analogous to the one under consideration than
is the Smith case. In the case at bar, the uncontradicted facts
show a wholesaler-retailer relationship. The only evidence
to the contrary is Ingram's statement to the officer that he
was "employed" by the Union Ice Company. In Fesler v.
Rawlins, 43 Cal.App.2d 541, 544 [111 P.2d 380], it was said:
"It is axiomatic that agency cannot be established by the
declarations of the agent not under oath or in the presence
of the principal. As stated in 1 California Jurisprudence,
698. 'if the rule were otherwise any rogue could use the name
of an honest man to facilitate his roguery.' " See also
Mechem Outlines Agency (3d ed.), § 112, p. 68.)
It follows that the nonsuit was improperly granted as to
defendant Ingram in that the evidence was sufficient on the
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of his negligence to permit the submission of the cause to
jury. [16] The nonsuit as to the defendant Union Ice
Company was properly granted in that there is no evidence
snfficient substantiality on the issue of agency to have permitted the cause to go to the jury.
The judgment in favor of defendant Ingram is therefore
and the judgment in favor of defendant Union Ice
Company is affirmed.
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Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J.,
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:!fANNING'S, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant, v. WILLIAM A. BURKETT, as Director of Employment, etc.,
Respondent.
[1] Unemployment Insurance·-Actions to Recover Contributions
Paid.-A complaint to recover unemployment insurance contributions allegedly overpaid by a corporate employer for the
years 1944 and 1945 sufficiently alleges a duty by defendant
Director of Employment to refund any overpayments made by
plaintiff during the pendency of a protest proceeding filed by
it, notwithstanding a failure to allege that proper and timely
protests were filed by plaintiff in those years, and it is error
to sustain a demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend,
where that part of Unemployment Insurance Act, § 41.1, as it
read when the overpayments were allegedly made, requiring
that a protest be made within 6G days after the mailing of a
statement, did not apply to statements furnished to plaintiff
during the pendency of the protest proceeding- filed by it.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Herbert C. Kaufman,
Judge. Reversed.
Action by corporate employer against Director of Employment to recover contributions allegedly overpaid to unemploy[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Unemployment Relief
-Insurance Act,§ 7 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Unemployment Insurance, § 45.

